Transnational Climate Change Governance and the Global South by Chan, Sander & van Asselt, Harro
-- DRAFT – Do not cite or circulate without authors’ permission -- 
1 






German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Email: sander.Chan@die-gdi.de 
Harro van Asselt 
 
University of Eastern Finland and 













Alongside intergovernmental climate change negotiations, a groundswell of climate actions by cities, 
regions, businesses, investors, and civil society groups has emerged. These transnational actors seek 
to address mitigation and adaptation to climate change; independently, with each other and with 
governments and international organizations. Many have welcomed transnational climate initiatives 
as a crucial addition to the formal climate regime, contributing to a growing momentum to act on 
climate change. However, critics have raised concerns about whether transnational actors are 
genuinely interested in mitigation and adaptation, or whether they are they are representing business-
as-usual as clean and green. Moreover, are transnational climate initiatives appropriately targeted to 
address needs of both developed and developing countries; do they exacerbate imbalances in global 
climate governance between the global North and South? This paper explores the multifaceted 
relation between developing countries and transnational climate governance. It discusses developing 
country engagement on the basis of their political support for transnational initiatives, their leadership 
of, and participation in transnational climate initiatives, and the implementation and performance of 
such initiatives from the perspective of the global South.  
                                                          
1 The authors wish to thank Friederike Eichhorn for her research assistance. 
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Transnational Climate Change Governance and the Global South 
 




On the road to the Paris Agreement, the world has witnessed a surge in the number of transnational 
climate initiatives, which has helped to build pressure on governments to agree on an ambitious 
political outcome, and shape a new climate diplomacy and politics (Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015, Jacobs 
2016, Chan, Bauer et al. fc. 2016). In recent discussions on transnational2 climate initiatives, scholars 
and international organizations have emphasized the potential of this groundswell of action to close 
the global climate change mitigation gap, which remains even if all governments would deliver on their 
promises (Blok, Höhne et al. 2012, UNEP 2013; UNFCCC 2016). Several studies on the mitigation 
potential of transnational climate initiaitives confirm that transnational actors could help close the 
global mitigation gap (Höhne, Dixson-Declève et al. 2014, Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015, Roelfsema, Harmsen 
et al. 2015). 
 
Within the UNFCCC process, transnational climate initiatives have increasingly been recognized. The 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) negotiation process leading 
up to the Paris Agreement included a Workstream 2 on enhancing action before 2020, which 
emphasized the need for climate actions by governments, international organizations, civil society and 
business. Since 2014, Workstream 2 featured a ’technical examination process’ (TEP) consisting of in-
session thematic ’technical expert meetings’ that feature ”specific policies, practices and actions 
representing best practices and with the the potential to be scalable and replicable”. These expert 
meetings have provided a rare interface between state and non-state actors in the UNFCCC process to 
facilitate an exchange of experiences and solutions (Chan, Bauer et al. fc. 2016). 
 
The most notable international recognition of transnational climate action, however, was witnessed 
outside of the UNFCCC process. The UN Secretary General’s 2014 UN Climate Summit was a 
culmination point for transnational climate action: while leaders from government, business and 
investors, civil society launched their climate commitments, an unprecedented 300,000 people took 
the streets in New York and in other cities around the world calling for global action against climate 
change. 
 
Successive presidents of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, the governments of Peru 
and France, and the UNFCCC secretariat subsequently joined efforts by the Office of the General 
Secretary of the United Naions, to form the ’Lima-Paris Action Agenda’ (LPAA). The LPAA continued to 
develop a platform providing a broad overview of transnational climate initiatives, the ’Non-State 
Actor Zone for Climate Action’ (NAZCA), and to moblize new transnational climate initiatives on the 
road to Paris. At COP21, the LPAA presented over 70 initiatives (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate 
Actions 2015a). In Paris, the role of transnational climate initiatives, especially in relation to pre-2020 
                                                          
2 Our understanding of ‘transnational’ includes a variety of stakeholders, including business, civil society, cities 
and regions. We prefer transnational to the widely used term ‘non-state’, which has also been used to denote 
the same multiplicity of actors. Cities and regions are governmental actors; therefore designating them non-state 
seems inaccurate. Arguably, by assuming a role in global politics beyond their traditional localized jurisdictions, 
cities and regions act as transnational rather than sub-national actors. The UNFCCC refers to ‘non-Party’ 
stakeholders, a broad designation to every actor that is not a national government party to the convention. We 
regard transnational a more suitable term, because governments may act as transnational actors, in particular 
alongside other types of actors in hybrid arrangements. Moreover, under the UNFCCC, Taiwan and the Holy See 
are non-Parties, even though they are de facto governmental authorities. We acknowledge that distinctions 
between state and non-state, national and sub-national, and transnational are subject to interpretation, and 
some actors (e.g. state-owned enterprises) remain difficult to classify. 
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action was further confirmed. UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21 extends the TEP, providing a separate process 
to examine of adaptation policies, practies and and actions. Furthermore, the COP ensured greater 
institutional continuity to mobilize and strengthen transnational climate initiatives by providing for the 
appointment of high-level champions with overlapping terms (Chan, Bauer et al. fc. 2016). Arguably 
more consequential is the fact that the Paris Agreement puts in place a new climate architecture that 
is more likely to interact positively with transnational climate initiatives on the national level. 
 
The post-Paris climate governance architecture is characterized by a bottom-up approach, based on 
nationally setermined contributions (NDCs). A bottom-up architecture recasts the relation with 
transnational climate governance. Where transnational climate initiatives could previously be seen as 
a means to shift responsibilities to private actors, now such initiatives can provide an opportunity to 
’share the burden’ at the national level, contribute to the implementation of a Party’s NDC, and create 
room for to ratchet up national commitments in successive rounds of NDC reviews. 
 
Notwithstanding growing international political recognition, improved visibility (for instance through 
the NAZCA portal), and good prospects to relate the groundswell of transnational climate initiatives to 
the post-Paris bottom-up governance architecture, the relation between transnational climate 
governance and developing countries is not well understood (cf. Chan and Hale 2015). This paper 
explores the multifaceted relation between developing countries and transnational climate 
governance at multiple levels. 
 
While we refer to developing and developed countries, we do not subscribe to a binominal distinction 
as an accurate social or economic understanding. A close examination of existing studies and samples, 
however, allow us to reveal patterns of participation, geographic imbalances, performance and also a 
finer grained understanding between types of developing countries as implementation contexts for 
transnational climate initiatives.3 
 
To do so, we focus our analysis on different aspects of the relationship between transnational climate 
governance and the global South (Figure 1). First, we seek to better understand developing country 
engagement on the basis of their political stances: what have been the concerns of developing 
countries about closer transnational engagement, and to which extent has there been support for 
transnational initiatives? Second, we examine samples of transnational climate initiatives to examine 
patterns of participation. In particular, we examine to which extent developing countries are involved 
in the initiation or leadership of transnational initiatives, and to which extent participants from the 
global South are engaged in these initiatives. Third, we analyse the extent to which transnational 
climate initiatives are implemented in developing countries. Lastly, we offer some thoughts on the 
extent to which transnational climate initiatives bring about results in the developing countries. 
 
By doing so, we offer some preliminary insights into the legitimacy of transnational climate change 
governance from the perspective of the global South. Specifically, we offer an indication of the input 
legitimacy of transnational climate governance by highlighting the level of participation (including 
leadership) of actors from the global South. We also offer a rough indication of the output legitimacy 
of transnational climate governance, by examining to which extent such initiatives are implemented 
in, and perform for, the global South (cf. Gupta and Biermann 2011). However, it should be added that 
these indications are by no means perfect – legitimacy depends on a range of other factors, such as 
accountability and transparency (see Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma 2009; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
                                                          
3  The distinction between the global North and South, income categories, and level of development is 
controversial; not in the least because of the fact that the group of ‘non-OECD’ countries has grown far apart in 
the last decade (Fantom and Serajuddin 2016). The World Bank is phasing out the use of ‘developing world’ in its 
2016 World Development Indicators (Khokhar and Serajuddin 2015). However, the classification of 
high/middle/low income countries continues to be used. 
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McGee 2013). Moreover, as this analysis is carried out by looking at samples of transnational initiatives 
in aggregate, no conclusions can be drawn about the legitimacy of individual initiatives. 
 
Figure 1. Analytical framework for the relationship between transnational climate governance and 
the global South 
 
Given the relatively novel developments of institutional linkages between the international climate 
regime and transnational climate initiatives, our study is limited by a lack of data, for instance on the 
performance (i.e. effectiveness) of transnational initiatives. In particular, the implications of the COP21 
decision and the Paris Agreement are still unclear. Taking into account these constraints, we draw on 
existing research on samples of transnational climate initiatives. 
 
The paper proceeds to discuss the level of political support on transnational engagement in Section 2. 
Section 3 discusses in the possible implications of the emergence of transnational climate governance 
for developing countries, focusing on leadership, participation, implementation and performance. 
Section 4 discusses evidence from current studies and participatory performance patterns, and 
geographic imbalances. The concluding Section 5 discusses implications of transnational climate 
governance for developing countries; point out imbalances between developed and developing 
countries; and outline opportunities for developing countries in transnational climate governance. 
 
2. Political stances on transnational engagement 
 
The emergence of transnational climate initiatives has been broadly welcomed by Parties to the 
UNFCCC and observer organizations. (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015b). At the 
same time, they have also raised a number of concerns. This section discusses the extent to which 
transnational climate action has found support in formal submissions, drawing on a review of formal 
submissions by developing country Parties and groups of Parties to the UNFCCC’s Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action (2012-2015). 
 
This review shows that there has been broad support for transnational climate initiatives, particularly 
as a means to bridge the emissions gap (see above). The most vocal supporters from the group of 
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developing countries have been the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Association of 
Independent Latin American Countries (AILAC). A proposal made by AOSIS, supported by AILAC, 
formed the basis for the high-level meeting that ultimately found its way into the Paris Agreement 
(AOSIS 2014; see also AILAC 2014). Support has also been voiced with respect to specific issue areas of 
interest to countries in the global South, such as the role of the private sector in providing climate 
finance and technologies (EIG 2013) and transnational initiatives related to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) (Bangladesh et al. 2013). 
 
However, many submissions from developing countries in relation to ’international cooperative 
initiatives’ usually added an important caveat in their statements acknowledging or supporting such 
initiatives: such initiatives have to be in line with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC (see e.g. 
BASIC 2014). This caveat points to various arguments. First, as argued by, for instance, the Like-Minded 
Developing Countries (LMDC 2013), transnational climate initiatives should not lead to any new or 
additional commitments on their part. Second, some Parties argue that such initiatives cannot detract 
from the obligations of developed countries (e.g. African Group 2013a; India 2013) or countries in 
general (LDC Group 2012). A third concern, voiced by China, is related to sovereignty. This concern is 
primarily aimed at transnational governance that involves subnational authorities. For China, 
”[a]ctions by cities, subnational authorities and sectors in developing country Parties are part of their 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (China 2014). In other words, China argues that even though 
cities and other subnational authorities may participate in transnational initiatives, any such actions 
need to be seen as part of China’s efforts. Finally, concerns have been raised with respect to the 
accounting for transnational initiatives, and particularly whether credit can be given for actions outside 
a Party’s territory (South Africa 2014). 
 
To address some of these concerns, some Parties proposed further clarification regarding the actions 
taken by transnational initiatives. For instance, the African Group (2013b) proposed that Parties should 
provide information on how such initiatives apply UNFCCC principles; what kind of mitigation and 
adaptation benefits are delivered; what barriers are encountered, and how to overcome them; and 
the extent to which finance, technology and capacity-building support is provided. 
 
By 2015, with negotiations on the Paris Agreement shifting into full gear, Party submissions hardly 
addressed the role of transnational climate action, and by mid-2015 a variety of negotiating groups, 
including the Group of 77 and China, offered support for a recognition of the efforts of transnational 
initiatives, as well as their further encouragement (UNFCCC 2015). 
 
In short, developing country Parties in the negotiations in the run-up to Paris were cautiously positive 
about the role of transnational climate governance, but also raised a number of important concerns 
about their relationship to the UNFCCC. Notwithstanding such concerns, by the time of COP21 the 
’landing zone’ for transnational climate action – which was broadly supportive and encouraging, as 
discussed above – was also embraced by developing country Parties. 
 
3. Transnational climate governance and the global South: current evidence 
 
In this section we investigate different types of geographic imbalances in current studies on 
transnational climate and sustainability governance. We focus on larger comparative studies, which 
can render a better, empirically founded understanding of geographic patterns of leadership and 
coordination; participation; implementation; and performance. However, the comparability between 
studies is limited for several reasons: 
  
- Different processes and issue areas: 
o Researchers have focused samples related to specific political processes, such as the 
2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012); 
the 2014 UN Climate Summit (Chan, Falkner et al. 2015, Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015); and 
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the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a). 
Others have focused on specific transnational initiatives in certain issue areas, such as 
health (Buse 2004), cities (Bansard, Pattberg et al. 2016), energy (Szulecki, Pattberg et 
al. 2011). Other scholars have sampled sets of transnational climate initiatives that are 
not related to certain political processes, nor specific issue areas within climate change 
(e.g. Hoffmann 2011, Bulkeley, Andonova et al. 2014). 
- Different types of initiatives: 
o Some researchers have focused on collaborative transnational arrangements, such as 
partnerships (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012), whereas others have focused on 
commitments, pledges and promises by transnational actors (Chan, Falkner et al. 
2015, Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015); yet others have described individual actions (CDP and 
The Climate Group 2015). 
- Different sample sizes: 
o While we review studies that compare larger sets of transnationational initiatives, 
there is a very wide range in terms of sample sizes. Some studies describe in greater 
detail smaller sample sizes (e.g. Bansard et al. 2016 include 13 transnational municipal 
networks), while Hsu et al. (2016) describe aggregate characteristics of 7069 individual 
commitments by transnational actors registered in the Non-State Actor Zone for 
Climate Action (NAZCA). 
- Different types of geographic imbalances addressed: 
o While many studies describe geographic imbalances, imbalances can be found across 
many dimensions. For instance, several studies refer to imbalances in the leadership, 
coordination, or initiation of transnational initiatives (Buse 2004; Pattberg, Biermann 
et al. 2012; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a); others focus on 
participating actors in transnational initiatives (Bulkeley, Andonova et al. 2014, Cheng, 
Hsu et al. 2015)); some investigated where transnational initiatives are implemented 
(Pattberg 2012; Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Galvanizing 
the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a; Chan, Falkner et al. fc. 2016); yet others 
consider the performance of transnational governance initiatives across different 
geographies (Chan 2009; Chan 2012; Compagnon 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; 
Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). 
- Different measures and categories: 
o Different categories, units and measurements are used acrossed different studies. 
While many studies indicate differences between regions and country groups; some 
refer to individual countries (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a), 
continents and world regions (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012), or countries by income 
group (Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). When estimating 
performance or effectiveness, a popular measure has been based on output 
measurement (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015), but 
alternative performance estimates across geographies are also found. For instance, 
Eichhorn and Chan (fc. 2016) consider whether initiatives have been awarded. 
 
Although these considerations limit the comparability and aggregate estimates of geographic 
imbalances across multiple dimensions (e.g. participation, leadership and performance), we 
consistently found references to differences between developed and developing countries; and often 
also differences between different groups of developing countries, for instance between emerging 
economies and least developed economies. Moreover, current studies address one or more of the 
following questions: 
 
- Who leads or coordinates transnational initiatives? 
- Who participates in transnational initiatives? 
- Where do transnational initiatives implement? 
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- How do transnational initiatives perform? 
 
The following meta-analysis of current large-n studies of transnational initiatives, includes samples of 
climate initiatives (often related to international processes, in particular climate negotiations, and 
samples underlying comparative analyses). However, climate initiatives are not limited to mitigation 
efforts, and often climate initiatives are also sustainability initiatives and vice versa. Large samples of 
sustainable development initiatives, such as ’partnerships for sustainable development’ address 
multiple aspects of climate change, for instance resilience, or renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Therefore we have cast our net wider, including studies on sustainability initiatives, when their samples 
include a sizable amounts of climate initiatives. 
 
3.1 Who leads or coordinates transnational initiatives? 
 
Leadership indicates which types of actors are empowered in coordinating positions, or initiate of 
initiatives. Playing a role in the initiation of climate actions presumes a better position to define the 
aims, operations and terms of a transnational initiative; indicating a re relatively powerful voice and 
influence compared to other participants in transnational initiatives. 
 
The most often used indicators for leadership are the location of secretariats and coordinating partners 
(Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate 
Actions 2015a); the location of individually committing actors (Hsu, Cheng et al. 2016); the types and 
location of actors in governing boards (cf. Buse 2004), and the centrality of actors in transnational 
networks (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015, Bansard, Pattberg et al. 2016). 
 
Given the many types of indicators and categories used across different studies, the following figure is 
for visual representation only, giving a rough overview of estimates of the balance between the global 




Figure 2. Leadership patterns in transnational climate governance 
 
Notwithstanding the different methodologies used, current studies all show the that geographic 
pattern in terms of leadership is extremely imbalanced. Developing country-based actors are only 
leading a very small proportion of transnational initiatives, while most studies put the proportion of 
initiatives led by Northern-based actors at 70-90%. For instance, in a list of ‘top corporate and sub-
national climate commitments’, CDP and The Climate Group (2015) only list two commitments from 
emerging economies (China and India) out of a total of 58 commitments.This skewed pattern indicates 
a systematic underrepresentation of Southern governments and Southern-based organizations in 
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coordinating positions within transnational arrangements (cf. Buse 2004), giving credence to worries 
by developing countries that they lack voice in transnational networks (Andonova and Levy 2003). By 
contrast, formal intergovernmental regimes have institutionalized developing country representation 
and voice, for instance through the one-country-one-voice/vote principle, or through special 
consideration of developing country circumstances (e.g. through differentiation in the climate regime; 
see Rajamani 2006). 
 
A few studies argue that Southern-based leadership may be underestimated. Hsu et al. (2016) argue 
that stakeholders in the developing world may be overlooked, giving the example of climate actions 
by Chinese banks that are not captured under the individual commitments in the UNFCCC’s NAZCA 
platform. Pattberg et al. (2012), moreover, find two developing countries among the top 10 of leading 
governments in partnerships for sustainable development launched at the 2002 World Summit for 
Sustainable Development, namely Indonesia and South Africa. However, the relative strong leadership 
displayed in these countries may likely be explained by their reputational stake in making the process 
around partnerships for sustainable development a success, as both were hosts to WSSD processes. 
 
Finally, many international organizations play leading roles within transnational initiatives (Andonova 
and Levy 2003; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015)). Although many of them may be Northern-based, they do 
not exclusively represent actors or interests based in the North. In fact, international organizations 
may be conducive to developing country participation (Compagnon 2012). 
 
3.2 Who participates in transnational initiatives? 
 
Patterns of participation across various studies show a very diverse array of actor types engaging in 
transnational initiatives. However, not every type of actor has been as much engaged in these 
initiatives. For instance, multiple studies indicate that ’traditional’ players in global politics, national 
governments and international organizations, make up a large proportion of partners within 
transnational initiatives (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012). By contrast, the same studies have found 
that ’new’ players, in particular business and civil society organizations, have been relatively 
underrepresented. This may be surprising, as most political processes – such as the LPAA, the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit, and the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development – emphasize business and 
civil society engagement. 
 
Estimates of North-South imbalances across the current literature are based on very different 
measures and methods. Several studies consider the proportion of transnational initiatives in their 
samples that include at least one or more actors based in different regions (Andonova and Levy 2003; 
Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Bulkeley, Andonova et al. 2014); other studies consider the proportion 
of types of countries or groups of countries within the total number of participating actors within a 
sample of transnational initiatives (CDP and The Climate Group 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of 
Climate Actions 2015a). Moreover, some studies only determine the geography of participating 
governments (Andonova and Levy 2003; Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012), while others consider 
different types of actors across developed and developing countries (Bulkeley, Andonova et al. 2014; 
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a). 
  
Given the many types of indicators and categories used across different studies, the following figure is 
for visual representation only, giving a rough overview of estimates of the balance between the global 
North and South in terms of participation within transnational initiatives. 
 




Figure 3. Participation patterns in transnational climate governance 
 
While the comparability between different studies is limited, most studies point to significant 
engagement of developing country-based actors, especially compared to patterns of leadership. 
However, the proportion of developing country-based participants varies widely across different 
samples and studies. Some studies point towards a relatively balanced patterns of participation; 
Andonova and Levy 2003 – looking at partnerships for sustainable development that involve all major 
stakeholder groups – count a slightly higher number of participating developing states relative to 
developed states. By contrast, Pattberg et al. (2012) find that – among partnerships for sustainable 
development – 56 percent do not include any state partner from the developing world. Bulkeley, 
Andonova et al. (2014) find that 77 percent in their sample include at least one actor based in the 
global South, but also find that actors in certain developing regions are especially marginalized, in 
particular in the Middle East and North Africa, Oceania, and Sub Saharan Africa. Similarly Hsu et al. 
(2016) identify ‘blind spots’ in the NAZCA sample of climate commitments, especially in China, Africa 
and South East Asia. An assessment of 72 initiatives under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (Galvanizing 
the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a), reveals that 64-84 percent of participating actors come 
from developed countries; a sharp bias towards Europe (especially COP21 host France) and North 
America. The same assessment finds substantial participation across Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, 
but much lower participation in other large developing countries, particularly India and China. 
 
Generally, most studies show a broad engagement of actors across most countries, for instance LPAA 
initiatives engaged participants from all countries in the world except Liechtenstein. However, a strong 
bias towards North-based participants remains. Moreover, the level of participation does not seem to 
be influenced by the size of developing countries, or their level of development (e.g. emerging and 
other developing countries). 
 
3.3 Where do transnational initiatives implement? 
 
Patterns of participation and leadership do not necessarily reveal whether developing countries 
benefit from implementation activities by transnational initiatives. A better understanding of 
geographic patterns of implementation allows for a better understanding of the geographic focus of 
climate initiatives, for instance: ‘which countries benefit most from investments through climate 
initiatives?’ In the context of global climate governance, this question is extremely relevant because 
the greatest financial and policy deficits to abate, and to adapt to, climate change are found in 
developing countries. Nonetheless, relatively few studies with larger sample sizes have assessed 
geographic patterns of implementation. 
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The few studies that investigate the geography of implementation by transnational initiatives, mostly 
consider statements and self-reporting by initiatives on where they (plan to) develop activities 
(Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate 
Actions 2015a; Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). Some studies identify countries where most transnational 
initiatives are being implemented (e.g. Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a); some 
studies compares frequencies of implementation across OECD and non-OECD countries (e.g. Pattberg, 
Biermann et al. 2012), and two studies consider geography of implementation by income group (Chan, 
Falkner et al. 2015; Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). 
 
The following visual representation gives a rough overview of estimates of the balance between the 
global North and South in terms of implementation. 
 
 
Figure 4. Patterns of countries of implementation in transnational climate governance 
  
Most studies reveal a relatively balanced focus on implementation in developing countries. Pattberg 
et al. (2012) find that almost 80 percent of countries of implementation are in the developing world; 
Chan et al. (2015) similarly find that 75 percent of countries of implementation are in the developing 
world. A study of initiatives that are part of the UNFCCC’s ‘Momentum for Change’ campaign (Eichhorn 
and Chan fc. 2016) even find that 90 percent of implementation activities are in developing countries. 
However, these studies also suggest significant differences between developing countries. Most 
implementation occurs in middle-income countries (Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Eichhorn and Chan fc. 
2016), which raises the question whether transnational initiatives cater to the needs, for instance, of 
least-developed countries or countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts. Moreover, 
certain regions see much more implementation activities than others; transnational initiatives 
disproportionally target developed countries, and Asia, while implementation activities are slightly 
underrepresented in Latin America and Africa (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012). 
 
An important shortcoming in most research is the fact that the determination of countries of 
implementation is based on self-reporting by initiatives, often at the moment of their launch. As a 
consequence, data on geographic patterns of implementation reflects what transnational initiatives 
plan to do, rather than what they are doing. A recent study compared reported countries of 
implementation’ with ‘actual countries of implementation’ of 52 climate initiatives launched at the 
2014 UN Climate Summit (Chan, Falkner et al. fc. 2016) and finds a reasonable balance of countries of 
implementation across low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, and high-income 
economies. However, actual implementation patterns suggest a stark imbalance, revealing greater 
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implementation gaps in low- and lower-middle income countries. This finding suggests that 
transnational initiatives initially respond to urgent needs in developing countries, but run into practical 
problems when implementing activities; they find it easier to implement in advanced economy 
contexts. 
  
Current studies indicate that transnational initiatives – at least initially – have a relatively balanced 
focus across the global North and South. This pattern contrasts starkly with Northern biases in terms 
of leadership and participation. A large proportion of transnational initiatives aim at implementation 
in developing countries, although there seems to be a slight preference for implementation in 
emerging developing countries. Recent data, however, suggests that actual implementation patterns 
are again biased towards high-income countries. 
 
3.4 How do transnational initiatives perform? 
 
The legitimacy of transnational initiatives is based on the claim that they deliver ‘on the ground’ – a 
claim that is often contrasted with the slow and incremental progress made by multilateral processes 
that often focus on rule development and coordination. For instance, at the 2002 World Summit for 
Sustainable Development, the overall complaint was that many of the agreed international outcomes 
since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro have not been effectively implemented, and the greater 
engagement from civil society and the private sector would contribute to more effective 
implementation (Mert and Chan 2012). However, few studies have assessed the actual performance 
of transnational initiatives. A performance assessment of transnational initiatives is complicated by 
the great variety among them, complicating measurement by the same standards. Therefore, a relative 
large number of recent studies focus on the ex ante assessment of transnational climate initiatives and 
their mitigation potential (Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015; Roelfsema, Harmsen et al. 2015, UNEP 2015). 
However, mitigation potential does not reveal much about what transnational actors actually achieve, 
and a focus on ex ante potential alone may lead to an unwarranted and overly optimistic estimation 
of the performance of transnational initiatives. Ex post comparative studies assessing the performance 
of transnational initiatives, however, are rare. Moreover, from the proxy indicators used for 
effectiveness or performance it is difficult or very difficult or even impossible to derive environmental 
impacts. Nonetheless, these ex post assessments of transnational initiatives indicate minimal 
effectivenss. Most ex post performance assessments have considered whether transnational initiatives 
are active and produce relevant outputs (Chan 2009; Szulecki, Pattberg et al. 2011; Pattberg, Biermann 
et al. 2012' Chan, Falkner et al. 2015)). Other studies have considered whether transnational initiatives 
accrue more funding (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Andonova 2010), and whether they have been 
awarded in a competitive environement (Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). In addition, only a few studies 
consider geographic imbalances in terms of performance (Szulecki, Pattberg et al. 2011; Chan 2012; 
Compagnon 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). 
 
The following table provides an overview of some of the findings in studies that consider geograhic 
imbalances and performance. 
 
Table 1. Performance of transnational climate initiatives 
 
Transnational initiatives perform better in developing countries 
Chan 2012 
Partnerships for sustainable development in emerging economies, India and 
China, performed ‘much higher than average’ (125) in terms of producing 
relevant outputs. 
Compagnon 2012 
Partnerships for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa perform above 
average in terms of producing relevant outputs (145). 
Eichhorn and 
Chan fc. 2016 
Initiatives under UNFCCC’s ‘Momentum for Change’ campaign that received 
rewards are overwhelmingly implemented in developing countries. Only 4 
percent of countries of implementation of awarded initiatives involved high-
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income countries, with 24 percent involving low-income, 43 percent lower-
middle-income, and 29 percent upper-middle-income countries. 
Transnational initiatives perform worse in developing countries 
Szulecki et al. 
2011 
The least effective transnational energy partnerships (in terms of output 
performance) include ‘weaker and poorer African countries’ (731). By contrast, 
the presence of industrialized countries and private for-profit partners 
correlates strongly with output performance. 
Chan et al. 2015 
Transnational climate actions that specifically address resilience focus on low-
income economies (26), but perform far below average in terms of output 
performance (28). 
 
Current scholarship does not provide a conclusive answer as to whether transnational initiatives in the 
global South perform better or worse than transnational initiatives implemented elsewhere. Chan 
(2012) and Compagnon (2012) suggest that transnational initiatives in developing countries perform 
above average; which may come as a surprise given the fact that many developing countries are seen 
as ‘areas of limited statehood’ (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). Studies that specifically focus on 
transnational climate initiatives indicate lower performance in developing countries (Szulecki, Pattberg 
et al. 2011; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015)), especially low-income countries. By contrast, an overwhelming 
majority of awarded Momentum for Change initiatives are implemented in developing countries, in 
particular lower-middle-income countries. Awarded initiatives have been evaluated positively on their 
practicality, scalability and replicability (Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). 
 
Not only do scattered findings remain inconclusive on the relation between performance and the 
geography of climate initiatives, many intervening factors influence the performance of transnational 
initiatives and their location. For instance, according to Compagnon (2012), the somewhat surprising 
finding that Sub-Saharan transnational initiatives perform better may well be due to the active role UN 
organizations play as leading partners in these initiatives. Another factor influencing performance 
relates to the specific issue areas transnational initiatives address. For instance, the low performance 
of transnational resilience initiatives may relate to the fact that the resilience issue area is relatively 
novel, and initiatives need more time to become more effective, rather than the fact that they focus 
on low-income countries (Chan, Falkner et al. 2015). Similarly, patterns of performance among 
transnational energy initiatives may be sector-specific rather than related to the country or region of 
implementation. 
 
4. Explaining geographic imbalances 
 
As the previous section illustrates, the geography of transnational climate and sustainability 
governance is highly unequal. Our meta-analysis of existing research on transnational climate and 
sustainable development initiatives shows that existing scholarship – notwithstanding the use of 
different methods and categories – seems to agree on geographically uneven patterns in transnational 
climate governance. Scholars agree on the initiating role of North-based partners and international 
organizations. The North/South imbalance is starkest in terms of leadership; transnational initiatives 
rarely have Southern-based actors as initiating or leading partners. In terms of participation, the 
geographic balance is slightly less skewed, if still imbalanced, indicating at least the willingness of 
Northern-based partners and international organizations to include partners in developing countries. 
In terms of where transnational actions plan to implement activities the North-South imbalance is least 
pronounced. The large majority of existing studies show a relatively balanced focus on countries in 
different income categories. An initial focus on implementation in developing countries, however, does 
not preclude failure to actually develop activities. At least one study indicates that the implementation 
gap is greater in developing countries. Finally, the relation between geography and performance of 
transnational initiatives is highly tenuous. Current studies do not agree whether transnational 
initiatives in developing countries are more or less effective. Multiple factors determine performance, 
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and whether activities are implemented in developing countries may or may not be the decisive factor. 
Differences in performance have been most pronounced across different issue areas and sectors. 
 
What accounts for the stark geographic imbalances, especially in terms of leadership, participation, 
and implementation? In the following, we briefly consider three explanations: selection biases, agency-
based outcomes, and the perpetuation of a political economy that marginalizes developing countries. 
 
4.1 Selection bias 
 
A direct explanation of observed North-South imbalances relates to selection bias. Online presence 
and presence at international conferences, and communications in English improve the visibility and 
recognizability of transnational initiatives, often at the expense of smaller, locally operating initiatives. 
Subsequently, observed geographic imbalances may be due to a selection bias, both in international 
political processes and in scholarship. 
 
Policy outreach to non-state and sub-national actors on the road to Paris mainly focused on initiatives 
with ‘high mitigation potential’, also fitting into the narrative of an ’emissions gap’ that needed to be 
bridged by transnational actions (UNEP 2013). Initiatives that gained a high-profile included actions 
that were initiated by (mostly Northern-based) multinational corporations, while smaller-scale and 
community-based resilience and adaptation actions primarily based in developing countries largely 
remained under the radar. 
 
Hale and Roger (2014) note that intitiatives that involve less prominent transnatioanal actors are often 
underrepresented, for instance at international conferences. This leads to a biased sample, which is 
further perpetuated in cumulative research, as researchers tend to focus on cases that have been 
studied before, creating a path dependency within current studies. Indeed, the analytical community 
seems to be mainly concerned with mitigation-oriented initiatives (Blok, Höhne et al. 2012; UNEP 2013; 
Hsu, Moffat et al. 2015; Roelfsema, Harmsen et al. 2015; The Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate 2015; UNEP 2015). Very few studies take into account other sustainability impacts, although 
climate actions have been studied in a context of sustainable development governance (Szulecki, 
Pattberg et al. 2011; Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012). 
 
Our meta-analysis does not give conclusive evidence on selection biases throughout accumulative 
studies. However, there are indications that many transnational actions in developing countries are 
overlooked. For instance, while most processes and research focus on initiatives with high-impact 
potential, the UNFCCC’s Momentum for Change campaign highlights almost 300 initiatives mostly 
implementing in developing countries (Eichhorn and Chan fc. 2016). This suggests that more efforts 
should be made to map transnational initiatives in the developing world (Chan and Hale 2015), and for 
internationational organizations to engage actors based in the global South. 
 
4.2 Agency-based outcomes 
 
Geographic imbalances have often been explained as agency-based outcomes. According to Bulkeley 
et al. (2014: 127), ”[f]rom an agency-based perspective, differences in capacities and interest explain 
[...] inequality of participation”. Developing countries, long sceptical of greater non-state and 
subnational engagement (see Section 2), have not only withheld political support for transnational 
engagement in international processes (Mert and Chan 2012), at times they actively contest 
transnational initiatives domestically (Quark 2011). 
 
Moreover, the ability of South-based actors to engage in transnational initiatives has also been 
questioned (Fisher and Green 2004; Green and Chambers 2006). Actors in developing countries may 
lack resources, expertise, means of communcation, or information to effectively engage. Lower 
transnational capacity in the global South, especially among public middle managers, limits the 
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possibilities to act and connect in an intercultural (international, intersectoral) environment, 
negatively impacting on the emergence of cross-sectoral, and collaborative governance arrangements 
(e.g. Koehn 2007). On the contrary, according to Andonova (2006: 44-45) “the more countries are 
involved in foreign aid transactions, the more their governments and development agencies are likely 
to have interests and political skills to participate in public‐private institutions”. 
 
Transnational initiatives may also choose to focus on emerging countries such as China or India instead 
of smaller and least-developed countries (Chan 2014), especially when they seek impacts at scale. 
Compared to regulatory governance, transnational initiatives are highly transient governance 
arrangements, prone to shifting commitments, coalitions and relatively unbound by promises, for 
instance to implement in certain countries. In the course of an initiative’s operation, it might withdraw 
from certain developing countries when they find out their environment is not supportive or too 
complicated for transnational linking. This might also account for the relative wide implementation 
gap within initiatives, between planned implementation and actual implementation (Chan, Falkner et 
al. fc. 2016). 
 
In our meta-analysis, some evidence can be found towards greater presence in emerging countries 
(Szulecki, Pattberg et al. 2011; Chan 2012), while imbalances are found along multiple dimensions, 
leadership, participation, and implementation. Moreover, the strong presence of international 
organizations as leading partners and initiators of transnational action (Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; 
Chan, Falkner et al. 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a) suggests that a large 
part of transnational governance is actually driven by international organizations. International 
organizations increasingly act as ’orchestrators’ of transnational climate action (Abbott and Snidal 
2010; Hale and Roger 2011; Chan and Pauw 2014; Abbott, Genschel et al. 2015; Chan, van Asselt et al. 
2015). International organizations, often lacking the means to fulfill their mandates, need to 
reinvigorate, leverage influence and seek alternative resources through engaging transnational actors 
(Zammit 2003; Abbott et al. 2015). 
 
4.3 Continued marginalization 
 
An alternative explanation for observed geographic imbalances relate to a political economy which 
consolidates powerful actors, in particular Northern-based governments and corporations, at the 
expense of marginalized communities and developing countries. In this view, transnational governance 
helps to entrench and even aggravate patterns of hegemony and marginalization (Clapp 2008), while 
operating through a language of governance and civil society participation (O’Brien et al. 2002). 
Transnational initiatives subsequently become neo-liberal instruments, reinforcing market 
environmentalism while shifting power away from multilateral institutions to the private sector (Levy 
and Newell 2002; Matthews and Paterson 2005). Although transnational initiatives claim to be 
equitable and inclusive, in many countries they operate under conditions of limited statehood; 
therefore, as they assume public functions, they practically contribute to a further rollback of the state 
(Miraftab 2004). 
 
Our meta-analysis indicates that transnational initiatives do not necessarily benefit developing 
countries. Decision-making power largely resides with North-based actors, perpetuating and perhaps 
aggravating North-South asymmetries. While a large majority of transnational initiatives claim to work 
in – and benefit – developing countries, evidence on performance and actual implementation suggests 
that benefits do not accrue to developing countries, especially least-developed, low-income countries. 
However, the generally low participation of business actors across many research samples (Andonova 
and Levy 2003; Pattberg, Biermann et al. 2012; Chan, Falkner et al. 2015) also does not vindicate 
transnational initiatives as instruments for corporate take-over or privatization of sustainability and 
climate policies. 
 




Our analysis shows a highly unequal geography of transnational climate and sustainability governance. 
Although governments from developing countries have grown more favourably disposed towards 
engaging transnational actors in the formal climate regime, there is no evidence that they, or 
communities in their countries will be the main beneficiaries of transnational climate governance. 
Especially worrying is the stark imbalance in terms of transnational leadership. Northern-based actors 
initiate transnational initiatives, design operations, and set the terms. While this may lower the cost 
of participation for South-based actors, they lack voice and influence in shaping the transnational 
sphere of governance. Even when participatory patterns are slighly less skewed, benefits do not accrue 
to developing countries and actors based in developing countries. Notwithstanding a widely shared 
focus on implementation in developing countries, the implementation gap in especially low-income 
countries is much wider than in advanced economies. 
 
Geographic imbalances, political, leadership, participatory, and implementation gaps in the South are 
not easily remedied, or explained away through a mere selection bias. For instance, initiatives under 
the Momentum for Change campaign seem to be an outlier that focus and implement on developing 
countries. However, the Momentum for Change campaign is a concerted effort by the UNFCCC 
secretariat to reach out, for instance, to initiatives that contribute both to mitigation and adaptation 
efforts, and improvement of livelihoods. Similarly, the organizers of the 2014 UN Climate Summit made 
an effort to broaden its climate action areas beyond mitigation by including resilience as an action area. 
This shows that orchestration, especially by international organizations, matters (Hale and Roger 
2011). International organizations have an important role to play in recognizing transnational actions 
in developing countries. However, there are limits to the role they can play, as they have limited 
mandates, and limited financial and non-financial means (Mert and Chan 2012; Chan and Pauw 2014). 
Moreover, a centralized orchestrating framework that forces a deeper transnational engagement with 
the global South would also be contrary to the voluntary nature of transnational initiatives and possibly 
drain resources from traditional development assistance (cf. Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Instead, a 
wider network of orchestrators (both governmental and non-governmental, from developing and 
developed countries) would be better positioned to ensure a wide of participation and a truly global 
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